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Abstract 
This paper quantifies the effects of the totalization agreements that coordinate the United States 
Social Security program with the comparable programs of other countries. For each treated 
country that has signed an agreement with the U.S., we construct a synthetic control country by 
properly weighting other countries that have not signed a totalization agreement with the U.S. to 
make sure that the resulting synthetic control mimics the behavior of the treated country before 
the totalization agreement entered into force.  Using the synthetic country to approximate what 
would happen to the treated country after the agreement, we find, on average, that totalization 
agreements reduce U.S. exports significantly and increase U.S. imports and U.S. foreign direct 
investment in the fifth year after the agreement.  Moreover, we find the effects are quite 
heterogeneous across countries/agreements, with some agreements increasing U.S. exports 
and others decreasing U.S. imports, both of which are the opposite of the average effects. In 
future work, we will investigate why the effects vary across countries by relating the estimates in 
this paper to the bilateral trade patterns between the U.S. and the treated countries, as well as 
the number and composition of beneficiaries of the totalization agreements. 
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Introduction 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the United States established a network of Social 
Security agreements that coordinate the U.S. Social Security program with the 
comparable programs of other countries.1 These international Social Security 
agreements, often called the “totalization agreements,” have three main purposes. First, 
they eliminate dual Social Security taxation, the situation that occurs when a worker 
from one country works in another country and is required to pay Social Security taxes 
to both countries on the same earnings. Second, the agreements help fill gaps in benefit 
protection for workers who have divided their careers between the U.S. and another 
country. Finally, totalization agreements permit unrestricted payment of benefits to 
residents of the two countries. 
Conceptually, by reducing the tax and increasing benefit protection for U.S. 
citizens working in other countries and vice versa, the totalization agreements should 
have a positive effect on U.S. citizens working in countries that have signed such an 
agreement with the U.S., as well as the citizens from those countries working in the U.S. 
By promoting international labor mobility, the totalization agreements could also affect 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and bilateral trade.  
Theoretically, however, it’s not clear whether the trade effects will be positive or 
negative. On the one hand, the totalization agreements may increase bilateral trade if 
increased international labor mobility helps reduce the transaction cost of international 
trade. On the other hand, however, the totalization agreements may reduce trade if 
                                               
1 This introductory paragraph draws from the description by the Social Security Administration. 
https://www.ssa.gov/international/agreements_overview.html 
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factor mobility and trade are substitutes, as shown by Mundell (1957) in a standard 
Heckscher-Olin model. For example, if the totalization agreement between Italy and the 
U.S. makes it easier for Boeing to send its engineers to Italy and produce airplanes 
there, it may reduce the number of airplanes exported from the U.S. to Italy. A reduction 
in U.S. exports is often perceived as contributing to fewer U.S. jobs, but this view 
ignores the fact that Boeing’s physical presence in Italy might mean more airplane sales 
for Boeing and fewer for Airbus. Factor mobility and trade may also be complements. 
Additionally, FDI is generally associated with higher domestic employment (Grimm and 
Kim 2016).  
Wong (1986) studies the conditions under which international trade and factor 
mobility are substitutes versus complements. Empirically, Gould (1994) estimates a 
positive effect of the number of immigrants from a country in the U.S. on the bilateral 
trade between the two countries, a finding supported by many subsequent studies. As 
most of the immigrants live in the host country permanently, the estimates may not 
apply to the totalization agreements, which mainly promote temporary international 
migration.    
Quantitatively, the potential effects of a totalization agreement depend on at least 
three factors: the size of the population considering working abroad, the size of the 
Social Security taxes and benefits relative to other costs and benefits affecting their 
decisions, and the sensitivity of FDI and bilateral trade to international labor mobility. In 
2016, the total number of beneficiaries of the totalization agreements was 226,924.2 
This is an approximate lower-bound estimate of the total number of workers previously 
                                               
2 Table 5.M, Annual Statistical Supplement, 2017. Social Security Administration. 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2017/index.html 
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employed under a totalization agreement. The economic impact of a totalization 
agreement at a particular point of time depends on the number of U.S./foreign workers 
currently participating in the agreement. 
This paper estimates the effects of the totalization agreements empirically. We 
use the synthetic control method developed recently by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) 
and Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010, 2015), among others. As described in 
more detail later, for each country that has ever signed a totalization agreement with the 
U.S., referred to as the “treated country,” this method constructs a synthetic control 
country as the weighted average of other countries that have not signed a totalization 
agreement with the U.S. The weights are chosen such that the synthetic control country 
mimics the behavior of the treated country in terms of the outcome variable of interest 
before the totalization agreement entered into force. The totalization agreement’s 
effects are then measured by the differences in the outcome variable between the 
treated and the synthetic country since the agreement entered into force. Once we have 
a synthetic control for each treated country, we pool the pairs of countries together and 
estimate a totalization agreement’s average effects by running difference-in-differences 
(DID) type regressions. 
Relative to DID, the synthetic control method has at least two advantages. First, 
instead of simply assuming that the treated country shares the same trend with the 
control countries in the absence of a totalization agreement, the synthetic control 
method weights the control countries properly to explicitly ensure that the resulting 
synthetic control country does share the same trend with the treated country before the 
totalization agreement entered into force. Secondly, in addition to the average effect, 
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the synthetic control method can estimate the effect for each treated 
country/agreement. This allows us to study whether and how the effect varies across 
countries/agreements. 
Empirically, we find that, on average, the totalization agreements reduce U.S. 
exports and increase U.S. imports and FDI. The effect on exports are more significant 
both economically and statistically, while the effects on imports and FDI are not 
significant statistically until the fifth year after an agreement entered into force. 
Specifically, the U.S. exports to treated countries increase by about 50% on 
average in the six years between the year leading to the agreement and the fifth year 
after the agreement. In the absence of the agreement, the estimates suggest that the 
U.S. exports to those countries would double. This implies the totalization agreements 
reduce the growth of U.S. exports during the six years by about 50% on average.  
Moreover, we find the effects are quite different across countries/agreements. 
For example, although most of the totalization agreements are estimated to reduce U.S. 
exports, the estimates suggest an increase in U.S. exports due to the totalization 
agreements with Finland, Ireland, and the Czech Republic. Similarly, contrary to the 
average effect that sees an increase in U.S. imports, the estimates suggest a decrease 
in U.S. imports due to the totalization agreements with countries such as Italy, 
Germany, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, South Korea, and Australia.  
In future work, we will investigate why the effects vary across countries by 
relating the estimates in this paper to the bilateral trade patterns between the U.S. and 
the treated countries as well as the number and composition of the totalization 
agreements’ beneficiaries.  
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Data 
The date that each totalization agreement entered into force is obtained from the 
Social Security Administration.3 The basic characteristics of each country are obtained 
from the Penn World Table (PWT).4 We use PWT version 9.1, the most recent version 
with information on relative levels of income, output, input, and productivity, covering 
182 countries between 1950 and 2017. For FDI, we use the database from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis.5 It provides annual FDI position by country from 1980. We obtain 
annual trade (imports and exports) between the U.S. and other countries from the UN 
Comtrade Database.6  
Empirical strategy 
We use the synthetic control method developed recently by Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010, 2015), among 
others. Suppose there is a sample of 𝐼𝐼 + 1 countries indexed by 𝑖𝑖, among which 𝑖𝑖 = 1 is 
the only country with which the U.S. has established a totalization agreement which 
entered into force in year 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. The synthetic control estimator of the agreement’s impact 




where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the weight of country 𝑖𝑖 such that ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖>1 = 1 and each 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is between 0  
and 1. 






Let 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 be a vector of pre-agreement, i.e., before the year 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖, characteristics of 
country 𝑖𝑖, and let 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 be its 𝑚𝑚th element. The optimal weight 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is chosen by minimizing 
the following criterion function 






where 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is the relative importance of the 𝑚𝑚th element. An optimal choice of 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 
minimizes the mean squared error of the synthetic control estimator. 
Essentially, for the treated country 𝑖𝑖 = 1, the method constructs a synthetic 
control by properly weighting each of the potential control countries such that the 
resulting synthetic control country mimics the behavior of the treated country before the 
totalization agreement entered into force. The totalization agreement’s effects are then 
measured by the differences in the outcome variable between the treated and the 
synthetic country since the agreement. 
Because the synthetic control country is meant to approximate the counterfactual 
of the treated country 𝑖𝑖 = 1 in the absence of the totalization agreement, it’s important to 
restrict the pool of potential controls to countries similar to the treated country 𝑖𝑖 = 1 in 
the sense that the outcome variable 𝑦𝑦 is driven by the same structural process in both 
the treated country and the potential control countries. For example, in evaluating the 
effect of the totalization agreements on trade, Zimbabwe may not be a good control for 
Italy if the trade patterns between Zimbabwe and the U.S. are significantly different from 
those between Italy and the U.S. On the other hand, France may be a better control if 
its trade patterns with the U.S. are similar to those between Italy and the U.S. 
Given that the bilateral totalization agreement between the U.S. and other 
countries entered into force at different times, a natural group of potential controls for a 
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particular treated country are countries that signed the totalization agreement with the 
U.S. in later years. For example, the first totalization agreement signed between the 
U.S. and Italy entered into force on November 1, 1978. Countries that have signed a 
totalization agreement with the U.S. since then are arguably better controls for Italy in 
estimating the totalization agreement’s effect than other countries that have never 
signed a totalization agreement with the U.S. 
By definition, however, a potential control should not have a totalization 
agreement with the U.S. during the evaluation period. We thus exclude the countries 
that have signed a totalization agreement with the U.S. before the end of the evaluation 
period, and only use the countries that have signed a totalization agreement with the 
U.S. afterward as potential controls. For example, if we want to estimate the totalization 
agreement’s effects between Italy and the U.S. from 1978 to 1983, we would exclude 
Germany and Switzerland, which signed totalization agreements with the U.S. in 1979 
and 1980, respectively, and use other countries that signed a totalization agreement 
with the U.S. since 1984 as potential controls. 
Once we obtain a synthetic control for each treated country of interest, we pool 
these pairs of countries together and use the following event-study framework to 
estimate the average effect of the totalization agreements  
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = �𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
+ 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (3) 
where 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 is a dummy that equals one if country 𝑖𝑖 has been in the agreement with the 
U.S. for 𝑛𝑛 years by year 𝑡𝑡,  𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 and 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 are country pair and year fixed effects, 
respectively, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the error term. 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 measures the average effect of a 𝑛𝑛-year 
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agreement. This is essentially a modified DID framework with the synthetic instead of 
actual countries as controls. 
Implementation 
For each country of interest that has signed a totalization agreement with the 
U.S., we use 11 years of data: the year when the agreement entered into force, which is 
normalized to be year zero t = 0 in the results reported below, and five years before 
−5 ≤ t ≤ −1 and after 1 ≤ t ≤ 5 that. We use countries that have signed a totalization 
agreement with the U.S. five years after the country of interest as potential controls, and 
choose the weights such that the resulting weighted average (the synthetic control) 
mimics the behavior of the country of interest in the five years leading to the totalization 
agreement. This is operationalized using equation (2) where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 includes real GDP, 
population, and distance from the U.S., as well as the outcome variable of interest 
described below. 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is chosen to minimize the mean squared prediction error over the 
five years before the agreement, i.e., ∑ (𝑦𝑦1𝑡𝑡 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖>1 )2−1𝑡𝑡=−5 .7 With the synthetic 
control given by the weight for each country 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, we then use equation (1) to estimate the 
effect of the totalization agreement for t ≥ 0. 
By now, the U.S. has signed a totalization agreement with 30 countries. The last 
one, with Iceland, entered into force on March 1, 2019. Because we need five years of 
data after the agreement to evaluate its effect and at least one similar country that has 
signed an agreement afterward to construct the synthetic control, we cannot evaluate 
                                               
7 Given a value of 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖, equation (2) is used to solve for the optimal weight 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, which results in a 
particular value of the mean squared prediction error ∑ (𝑦𝑦1𝑡𝑡 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖>1 )2−1𝑡𝑡=−5 . The process is 
repeated until the mean squared prediction error is minimized, and the resulting 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 are 
used to construct the synthetic control estimator in equation (1). 
9 
the effect of the agreements signed recently, which, in practice, includes the six 
agreements signed since 2014. This leaves us with 24 agreements entered into force 
between November 1, 1978 (Italy), and March 1, 2009 (Poland). In practice, however, 
the sample size is slightly smaller because of missing data. For example, because the 
trade data for Luxembourg was combined with that of Belgium around the year (1993) 
when the totalization agreement between the U.S. and Luxembourg entered into force, 
we cannot evaluate the effect of this totalization agreement on trade. Additionally, 
because our data on FDI starts from 1980, we cannot evaluate the effect on FDI of the 
totalization agreements signed before 1985. 
Intuitively, the direct effect of the totalization agreements should be on 
international labor mobility. Theoretically, we could calculate the number of immigrants 
by country from the Current Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (ASEC), which has been collecting information on country of birth since 
1994, or from the annual American Community Survey (ACS) since 2000. However, as 
a majority (17 out of the 24 used in this paper) of the totalization agreements entered 
into force in or before 1994, and the number of immigrants calculated from survey data 
like ASEC and ACS is likely measured with error, such measures are less accurate than 
official statistics on FDI and trade. We choose not to evaluate the effect on international 
labor mobility in this paper, but will pursue it in the future with other data such as the 
annual number of visas issued to each country by the U.S. Department of State.  
We present results for three outcome variables—exports, imports, and FDI—all 
measured from the perspective of the U.S. That is, exports and imports are the U.S. 
exports to and imports from another country, respectively, and FDI is the FDI position 
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that the U.S. holds in another country. For each outcome variable, we normalize its 
value in the year before the agreement entered into force to be one. The values in other 
years are relative to the year before the agreement entered into force. We first present 
the average effect estimated from equation (3), and then report the results for each 
individual agreement to highlight the heterogeneity. As discussed above, the effect of a 
totalization agreement is measured by the difference between the treated and the 
synthetic country, under the assumption that the synthetic country represents how the 
treated would have behaved in the absence of the totalization agreement. That is, the 
approach assumes factors other than the totalization agreement, e.g., changes in 
exchange rates and the adoption of the Euro, have exactly the same effects on both the 
treated and the synthetic country, and thus their effects would be differenced out.  
Results 
Table 1 reports the average effects of an 𝑛𝑛-year agreement 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 estimated from 
equation (3). Each column uses a different outcome variable as indicated by the column 
title. Each row reports the estimate for a different year since the totalization agreement 
entered into force.  
The first column shows that, on average, the totalization agreements reduce U.S. 
exports to the treated country. The estimated effect increases (in absolute value) over 
time and is statistically significant two years after the agreement entered into force. The 
estimates suggest that a totalization agreement reduces the growth in U.S. exports to 
the treated country by about 50% in the first five years since the agreement entered into 
force. More precisely, as shown later in Figure 2, the U.S. exports to treated countries 
increased by about 50% between the year leading to the agreement and the fifth year 
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after the agreement. In the absence of the agreements, we estimate that the U.S. 
exports to those countries would double during the same period. 
The second column shows that, on average, a totalization agreement increases 
U.S. imports, but the effect is relatively small and only marginally significant statistically 
in the fifth year after the agreement entered into force. The estimates suggest that a 
totalization agreement increases the growth in U.S. imports from the treated country by 
about 13% in the first five years since the agreement entered into force. More precisely, 
as shown later in Figure 4, the U.S. imports from treated countries increased by about 
67% between the year leading to the agreement and the fifth year after the agreement. 
In the absence of the agreements, we estimate that the U.S. imports from those 
countries would only increase by about 54%. 
Finally, the last column shows that, on average, a totalization agreement has no 
significant effect on U.S. FDI until five years after the agreement entered into force. The 
estimates suggest that a totalization agreement increases the growth in U.S. FDI in the 
treated country by about 192% in the first five years since the agreement entered into 
force. More precisely, as shown later in Figure 6, the U.S. FDI in the treated countries 
increased by about 541% between the year leading to the agreement and the fifth year 
after the agreement. In the absence of the agreements, we estimate that the U.S. FDI in 
those countries would only increase by about 349%. 
Table 1. Average Effects of the Totalization Agreements 
 Exports Imports FDI 
Year 0 -0.046 0.069 -0.266 
(0.090) (0.076) (0.794) 
Year 1 -0.084 0.068 -0.050 
(0.090) (0.076) (0.794) 
Year 2 -0.233*** 0.037 -0.194 
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(0.090) (0.076) (0.794) 
Year 3 -0.308*** 0.005 -0.128 
(0.090) (0.076) (0.794) 
Year 4 -0.339*** 0.039 1.119 
(0.090) (0.076) (0.794) 
Year 5 -0.505*** 0.134* 1.924** 
(0.090) (0.076) (0.794) 
N 506 506 374 
 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard Errors are in the parentheses. 
As mentioned above, relative to traditional methods such as DID, one advantage 
of the synthetic control method is that it allows us to estimate the effect separately for 
each treated country/agreement, making it possible to study whether and how the effect 
varies across countries/agreements. For each treated country/agreement, Figures 1, 3, 
and 5 report the effects on U.S. exports, imports and FDI, respectively. The figures 
reveal two important messages. First, for each treated country and each outcome 
variable, the synthetic control country matches the behavior of the treated country very 
well before the agreement entered into force. This suggests that the synthetic control is 
doing a good job approximating the counterfactual of what would happen to the treated 
country in the absence of the totalization agreement.  
Second, for each outcome variable, the estimated effect varies significantly 
across countries/agreements. Consistent with the average effects estimated in Table 1, 
most panels in Figure 1 suggest a totalization agreement reduces the growth of U.S. 
exports to the treated country, although the size of the effect varies significantly across 
countries/agreements. However, for U.S. exports to countries such as Belgium, 
Canada, France, and the Netherlands, the estimates suggest a zero effect of the 
totalization agreements. Moreover, the estimates suggest an increase, although 
relatively small, in U.S. exports to countries such as Finland, Ireland, and the Czech 
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Republic due to the totalization agreements. Similarly, contrary to the small increase in 
the growth of U.S. imports from the treated countries estimated in Table 1, Figure 3 
suggests a decrease in the growth of U.S. imports following the totalization agreements 
with countries such as Italy, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, South Korea, and 
Australia, and a zero effect of the agreements with countries such as the Netherlands, 
Austria, Greece, and Chile. Finally, Figure 5 shows the estimated effect on U.S. FDI 
also varies significantly across countries/agreements. In future work, we will investigate 
why the effects vary across countries by relating the estimates in this paper to the 
bilateral trade patterns, e.g., the balance of trade prior to the totalization agreement, 
between the U.S. and the treated countries. 
Figures 2, 4, and 6 plot the average profiles of the treated and the synthetic 
countries in Figures 1, 3, and 5, respectively. They provide another way to visualize the 
average effects of the totalization agreements. In each case, we see that there is 
essentially no difference between the treated and synthetic countries before the 
totalization agreement entered into force. Afterward, however, we clearly see that, on 
average, a totalization agreement reduces the growth of U.S. exports over time, and the 
effects on U.S. imports and FDI are mostly small and statistically insignificant until the 
very end. 
Specifically, Figure 2 shows the U.S. exports to treated countries grow by about 
50% on average in the six years between the year leading to the agreement and the 
fifth year after the agreement. In the absence of the agreement, the estimates suggest 
that the U.S. exports to those countries would double. This implies the totalization 
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agreements reduce the growth of U.S. exports during the six years by about 50% on 
average.  
Figure 4 shows the U.S. imports from treated countries grow by about 67% on 
average in the six years between the year leading to the agreement and the fifth year 
after the agreement. In the absence of the agreement, the estimates suggest that the 
U.S. imports from those countries would only grow by about 54%. This implies the 
totalization agreements increase the growth of U.S. imports during the six years by 
about 13% on average. 
Figure 6 shows the U.S. FDI in treated countries grow by about 541% on 
average in the six years between the year leading to the agreement and the fifth year 
after the agreement. In the absence of the agreement, the estimates suggest that the 
U.S. FDI in those countries would only grow by about 349%. This implies the totalization 































Summary and future work 
Using the synthetic control method, we find that, on average, the totalization 
agreements reduce U.S. exports and increase U.S. imports and FDI. The effect on 
exports are more significant both economically and statistically, while the effects on 
imports and FDI are not significant statistically until the fifth year after an agreement 
entered into force. 
Moreover, we find the effects are quite different across countries/agreements. 
For example, although most of the totalization agreements are estimated to reduce U.S. 
exports, the estimates suggest an increase in U.S. exports due to the totalization 
agreements with Finland, Ireland, and the Czech Republic. Similarly, contrary to the 
average effect that sees an increase in U.S. imports, the estimates suggest a decrease 
in U.S. imports due to the totalization agreements with countries such as Italy, 
Germany, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, South Korea, and Australia.  
In future work, we will investigate why the effects vary across countries by 
relating the estimates in this paper to the bilateral trade patterns between the U.S. and 
the treated countries, as well as the number and composition of beneficiaries of the 




Abadie, A. and Gardeazabal, J., 2003. The economic costs of conflict: A case study of 
the Basque Country. American Economic Review, 93(1), pp.113-132. 
Abadie, A., Diamond, A. and Hainmueller, J., 2010. Synthetic control methods for 
comparative case studies: Estimating the effect of California’s tobacco control 
program. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 105(490), pp.493-505. 
Abadie, A., Diamond, A. and Hainmueller, J., 2015. Comparative politics and the 
synthetic control method. American Journal of Political Science, 59(2), pp.495-
510. 
Gould, D.M., 1994. Immigrant links to the home country: empirical implications for US 
bilateral trade flows. The Review of Economics and Statistics, pp.302-316. 
Grimm, A. and Kim, M., 2016. FDI and the task content of domestic employment for US 
multinationals. Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper, (286). 
Mundell, R.A., 1957. International trade and factor mobility. American Economic 
Review, 47(3), pp.321-335. 
Wong, K.Y., 1986. Are international trade and factor mobility substitutes? Journal of 
International Economics, 21(1-2), pp.25-43. 
